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ABSTRACT
Gavin and Kydland (1999) calculated the cyclical properties of money and prices for the
periods before and after the October 1979 policy change.  In this article, we extend that work by
adding four more years of data and including a study of nominal interest rates and inflation. The
adoption of a disinflation policy in October 1979 does not appear to have had a measurable
impact on the cyclical properties of real variables.  However, it made a dramatic difference in the
cyclical properties of nominal variables.  We also examine the covariance structure of several
nominal relationships: the autocovariance of inflation, the lag from money growth to inflation,
and lag from money growth to nominal GDP growth. Generally, the monetary policy in the early
period allowed the average inflation rate to ratchet upward with each business cycle.  This policy
was associated with high variances, high autocorrelations, and high cross-correlations among
nominal variables.  The moderate inflation policy followed in the second period was associated
with lower mean growth rates, less volatility, and lower cross-correlations between money
growth and inflation.
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There is a consensus concerning business cycle facts when the facts are about real
variables.  For example, Backus and Kehoe (1992) note that there is a similarity among
covariance structures of real time series taken from different countries and from different
sample periods within a country.  This consistency across data sets is no doubt one reason for
the large amount of research on real business cycles.
This consistency does not extend to data sets that include money and prices.
Backus and Kehoe (1992) found that the cyclical properties of money and prices were
unstable across historical periods and across countries. Rolnick and Weber (1997) noted
that the time-series properties of the prices and money are very different in economies
with commodity money standards than are in economies with fiat money standards.
Kydland and Prescott (1990) noted disagreement among economists about the cyclical
patterns in prices.  Wolf (1991), Cooley and Ohanian (1991) and Pakko (2000) show that
the cyclical behavior of prices in the United States varies from one episode to the next.
Several researchers have attributed this instability to changing policy regimes.  For
example, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) found that nominal-real relationships deteriorated
following the Federal Reserve’s policy change in 1979:Q3.  Bryan and Gavin (1994) and
Gavin and Kydland (1999) show that the correlations involving nominal variables of U.S.
data are very different in the period from 1959:Q1 to 1979:Q3 than they are in data sets
that begin in 1979:Q4.
While economists looking for the facts have tended to combine data across policy
regimes, there are many examples of empirical research where researchers have limited2
their data to the post 1979 data in recognition of instability in the data.
1  Many business
economists have stopped using the pre-1980 data in the financial sector equations of
forecasting models.
2  Naturally, the area where the awareness of the instability caused by
the policy shift is most acute is in modeling the monetary policy reaction function.
Empirical work in this area has been more careful about the break in the covariance
structure associated with policy changes.  Empirical studies on policy rules tend to split
the sample in 1979 or to use data series beginning sometime after October 1982 when the
nonborrowed reserve operating procedure was abandoned.   See, for example, work by
Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1993), Taylor (1993), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998),
Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), McNees (1992), Mehra
(1999), Kozecki (1999), Salemi (1995) and many of the studies in Taylor (1999).
Our goal is to document the nominal facts using as little theory as possible.  Gavin
and Kydland (1999) calculated the cyclical properties of money and prices for the periods
before and after the October 1979 policy change.  In this article, we extend that work in
several ways.  We add four more years of data.  We examine the cyclical properties of
nominal interest rates and inflation.  Finally, after looking at the cyclical behavior of nominal
variables we examine the covariance structure of several nominal relationships: the
autocovariance of inflation, the lag from money growth to inflation, and lag from money
growth to nominal GDP growth.
In the first part of the paper where we examine cyclical facts, we transform the data
using the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter. We have detrended all the series, including those for
                                                
1 Kydland and Prescott (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1995), Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Stock and
Watson (2000) report statistics on the cyclical properties of nominal variables using data sets that span the
October 1979 policy shift.3
inflation and interest rates.  We construct the trends using the data from the full sample
available, even in cases where we think there may be important breaks in the series.  We do
this partly because we do not know ahead of time whether there really are breaks in the
series.  Furthermore, even if such breaks exist, the problems in measuring the trend at the
endpoints may be worse than the use of data across regimes. Throughout this first section of
the paper, when we refer to a time series such as a monetary aggregate, GDP, or a price
index, we are talking about the deviation of the logarithm of the variable from the H-P trend.
Since there is some question about whether inflation rates and interest rates should be
detrended, we also look at the cyclical properties of these series without filtering them.
In the next section of the article that looks at nominal growth rates, we do not use the
H-P filter because we believe that, under fiat money standards, the interesting information in
nominal data is the trend induced by monetary policy.  While the Fed may have
accommodated cyclical demands for money and credit, the behavior of inflation shows that
the Fed has induced a long cycle in nominal variables that spans several business cycles.
Figure 1 shows CPI inflation between the 1959:Q2 and 1998:Q4.  There was a long period of
rising inflation, from the beginning of our sample until the end of the 1970s.  The inflation
rate dropped rapidly in the three years beginning in 1979:Q4.  Since then, the Fed seems to
have followed a policy of maintaining inflation along a moderate and slightly declining trend.
The Monetary Policy Regime Shift in October 1979.  We find a different set of
empirical regularities for post-1979 than we find for the pre-1979 period.   It is useful to
make a distinction between changes in the way the monetary policy decisions are made at
FOMC meetings and changes in the way FOMC decisions are implemented by the open
                                                                                                                                                
2 See for example, the forecasting model of Macroeconomic Advisors, Inc, in which the term structure
equation and monetary policy reaction function are estimated using only post-1982 data.4
market desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  In October 1979, both types of
change were made.   After October 1979, the FOMC made policy decisions as if they cared
more about deviations of inflation from the implied objective than they did before October
1979.
 3  The FOMC also changed the procedure the Desk used to implement the decision
made at the meeting.
FOMC Decision-making.  The FOMC chooses the policy setting at its policy
meetings.   Perhaps the best way to think about this is as a decision about where to locate the
money supply function.  The decision, both before and after the October 1979 policy change,
was to supply reserves in a way that is expected to lead to desired outcomes for inflation, and
output growth.   Each decision was also expected to result in particular outcomes for the fed
funds rate and the growth in the targeted monetary aggregates, particularly M1.  A
combination of theory, econometric models, and judgment would go into these decisions.
Before 1979, monetary policy resulted in a high and variable outcome for inflation.  After
October 1979, the FOMC appeared to put relatively more weight on controlling money
growth and inflation.
4  Gavin and Kydland (1999) show that shifts of this sort would be
expected to lead to significant shifts in the cyclical properties of nominal variables.  This is
the case whether or not the FOMC changes the way it implements the policy decision (its
operating procedure).
The Operating Procedure.  At the same time that it announced a new commitment to
reducing money growth and inflation, the FOMC announced a change in the way the Open
Market Desk of the New York Federal Reserve Bank would implement the decisions made at
                                                
3 See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), McNees (1992), Salemi (1994), and Chapter 7 in Taylor (1999) for
econometric evidence about the Fed’s reaction function in the two periods.  All find a significant increase
in the Fed’s relative concern about inflation after October 1979.
4 See references cited in footnote 3.5
FOMC meetings.
5  Prior to 1979, the FOMC decided on a target for the federal funds rate,
the market interest rate on overnight lending between banks.  The FOMC would direct the
manager of the System Open Market Account to buy and sell securities in order to maintain
the interest rate near the target level.  At each FOMC meeting, the staff of the Board of
Governors would present the committee with estimates of how much money growth to
expect from the alternative fed funds target choices.   During the intermeeting period,
surprises in the demand for reserves would be accommodated, so that surprises in money
demand showed up as variability in the quantity rather than the price of reserves.
On October 6, 1979, Paul Volcker announced that the procedure would be changed,
so that the manager of the open market desk would be required to trade securities to achieve
weekly targets for a reserve quantity, rather than the fed funds rate.  The policy change led to
a dramatic, 10-fold increase in the volatility of the fed funds rate and a high correlation
among changes in interest rates across the term structure and across national boundaries.  The
increased interest rate volatility caught the attention of the markets and the public.  It
probably helped Fed Chairman Paul Volcker achieve credibility for the disinflation policy.  It
did not, however, seem to lead to better control over the money stock.  As inflation fell to
around 4 percent at the end of 1982, the Federal Reserve abandoned the reserve-oriented
procedure and returned to an operating procedure that was an indirect form of interest rate
targeting.
6  In Alan Greenspan’s first term as Fed Chairman (which began in 1987), the
FOMC returned to an explicit interest rate targeting procedure.
The change in the operating procedure had a predictable effect on the volatility of
interest rates.   We think it is important to consider the interest rate correlations without the
                                                
5 See Gavin and Karamouzis (1985) for an elementary description of the alternative operating procedures.6
subperiod of reserve targeting because the variation in interest rates associated with the
nonborrowed reserve operating procedure overwhelmed variation in interest rates coming
from other sources.  However, this three-year period also included the longest and largest
recession of the post WWII era, so we are reluctant to exclude that period in all of our
investigations.  We note that none of the major results about the money stock, inflation, or
the real economy would be qualitatively different if we had excluded that period from the
analysis.  In general, we think that the high frequency correlations important for
understanding financial markets would be affected by the operating procedure, but they are
not the focus of this article.  In our judgment, the cyclical effect of changes in monetary
policy decision-making process will impact the aggregate price, money and output data at
business cycle frequencies in a similar manner even under very different procedures for
implementing the decisions.   The effect of alternative operating procedures on the variability
of interest rates was dramatic.  However, the short period and severe recession that occurred
during the period of nonborrowed reserve operating procedure makes it difficult to say
whether the operating procedure had any effect on the cyclical behavior of interest rates.
We begin by reviewing the business cycle facts for the real variables where we show
that the covariance structure is relatively stable across the October 1979 policy change.
Next, we examine the changes in the cyclical behavior of the monetary aggregates.  Here the
results are quite spectacular.  There were dramatic changes in behavior of all the monetary
aggregates.  Then, we look at measures of the price level and inflation.  Here the results for
inflation are almost as dramatic as for the monetary aggregates, but the results for the price
level are not.  Next, we find that cyclical behavior of nominal interest rates looks much like
                                                                                                                                                
6 See Thornton (1988) for an empirical analysis of the distinction (and similarities) between the Borrowed-
Reserve operating procedure adopted in 1982 and an interest rate procedure.7
the behavior of inflation, suggesting that the expected inflation premium dominates the real
interest rate as a source of cyclical variation in nominal rates.  Finally, we examine the
covariance structure among some nominal variables: the persistence of inflation as reflected
in its autocovariance structure, the cross-correlations between inflation and money growth,
and the cross-correlations between growth rates in nominal GDP and four definitions of the
money supply.
CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF NOMINAL TIME SERIES
In Gavin and Kydland (1999), we found that changes in monetary policy affect
the cyclical properties of nominal time series much more than they affect the cyclical
properties of real time series.  Before looking at the cyclical patterns in nominal
variables, we begin by reviewing the cyclical behavior of the real variables.  There are
two differences from the work present in our earlier paper.  First, we use business sector
output rather than GDP as the measure of output.  Business sector output is the measure
of output used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in reporting on labor productivity.  The
other difference is that we have extended the data set by adding quarterly data for the
years 1995 through 1998.
We decided to use business sector output because it is the measure used in
calculating productivity and it corresponds more closely with concept of output that we
typically use in macroeconomic theories.  Using a different measure of output and adding
four years to the sample do not change the results reported in our earlier paper.  The
cross-covariance structure among the real variables we examine—real business sector
output, personal consumption expenditures, expenditures on durables, expenditures on8
nondurables and services, domestic fixed investment, hours worked, and productivity—
appears to be largely unchanged across the 1979 change in monetary policy.
Figure 2 shows the cyclical patterns of real variables for the two periods.  We
measure cyclical patterns as correlations with the deviations of output from trend.  For
both of these periods and despite differences in data and time periods, the correlation
coefficients are quite similar to those reported by Gavin and Kydland (1999) and earlier
by Kydland and Prescott (1990).  Hours worked as well as the components of
consumption and investment are highly procyclical.  Consumption of nondurables and
services is less variable than output, while expenditures on durables and all the
components of investment are much more variable than output in percentage terms.
There does appear to be a change in the cyclical behavior of productivity; it leads the
cycle by two quarters in the earlier sub-sample, but appears coincident in the later period.
The last panel in the bottom right hand corner of Figure 1 shows the standard
deviations for each of the variables over the separate periods.  In each case, the standard
deviation is lower during the period following October 1979.
7  The biggest decline was in
the standard deviation of productivity growth which was 1/3 lower during the second
period.
Table 1 presents evidence about the statistical significance of the differences in
the correlation coefficients across sample periods.  We construct a Wald test to compare
the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient in the latter period is equal to the
correlation coefficient in the earlier period against the alternative that they are not equal.
8
If the two data series are treated as random samples drawn from a bivariate normal
                                                
7 See McConnell and Quiros (2000) for a discussion of the decline in output volatility after 1984.
8 See Ostle (1963) pp. 225-227, for a detailed description of the test statistic used.9
distribution, then the Wald statistic is distributed as a Chi-square with one degree of
freedom.  The 10 percent critical value is 2.71.  There are 8 of 77 statistics in the panel
that are greater than 2.71.  That is, for 69 of the 77 statistics compared in Table 1, the
evidence suggests that the behavior of real variables in the second half of the full sample
is the same as in the first half.
There is some doubt about whether the macroeconomic variables can be assumed
to follow a normal distribution—an important assumption for the reliability of the Wald
test.  To check the reliability of the Wald test we constructed small sample critical values
from 1000 repetitions of the following experiment.  Using actual data from the earlier
period (not deviations from trend), we estimated a bivariate vector autoregression that
includes business sector output and one of each of the other variables.  In every case, we
recovered estimates of autoregressive parameters and the covariance matrix.  Then these
estimates were used with a random number generator to create 1000 artificial series for
each pair.  Each series is 160 periods long.  These series were then detrended, the sample
split at period 83 (corresponding to 1979:Q3 in the U.S. sample) and the cross-
correlations calculated for each period.  For each artificial series, the Wald test was
constructed to determine stability across the two periods.  The 1000 test statistics were
sorted by size, and the one-hundredth largest is reported in parentheses below the Wald
statistic.  In every case for the real variables, the 10 percent critical value generated by
this Monte Carlo method was larger than the asymptotic value implied by the bivariate
normal assumption (2.71).  This alternative testing procedure makes it more difficult to
reject the null hypothesis, so the conclusions regarding the changes in cyclical behavior
have a conservative bias.  In Table 1, you can see that the small sample 10% critical10
value is always larger than the Wald statistic calculated using actual data.  Using this
Monte Carlo distribution with the real variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the same process generated the cross-correlations from both periods.
Money
In contrast to the real variables we examined in the previous section, the monetary
aggregates behaved very differently during the period after October 1979 than they did
before.  We included analysis of four alternative measures of the money supply.  The
narrowest aggregate included was the St. Louis Fed’s adjusted monetary base (SL Base)
as revised by Anderson and Rasche (1996).  The transactions aggregate we included was
MZM rather than M1 because it includes the sweep accounts that distort the M1 data
after 1994;  MZM is defined as M2 minus small denomination time deposits, plus
institutional money market mutual funds.  This aggregate was proposed by Motley
(1988).  The label MZM, money with zero maturity, was coined by Poole (1991).
Finally, we included M2, which is the Federal Reserve’s primary monetary target and the
M2 monetary services index (M2MSI) as constructed by Anderson, Jones and Nesmith
(1997).
Substantial changes occurred in the variability of the monetary aggregates around
trend.  The narrow aggregates—SL Base and MZM—are less variable before 1979:Q3
than afterward, while the broad monetary aggregates—M2 and M2MSI—become less
variable in the latter period.  The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the standard deviation
of the alternative measures of the money stocks for the two sub-samples.11
There were also large changes in the cyclical correlations shown in Figure 3.
Before 1979, all four of the monetary aggregates were highly procyclical.  The
procyclical behavior practically disappeared in the second period. The contemporaneous
correlation of the monetary base with real GDP falls from 0.47 to 0.11.  The
contemporaneous correlation of M2 drops dramatically, from 0.64 to 0.02.  A similar
drop occurred with the new measures, MZM and M2MSI.
Other than the dramatic change in contemporaneous correlations, there are few
patterns shared by the cyclical behavior of the aggregates.  In the earlier period, the SL
Base lagged behind the cycle in output; after 1979, it led the cycle by about a year.  MZM
and M2 led the cycle in both periods.  The cyclical pattern for M2 before 1979 was
essentially the same as the correlation pattern for MSIM2.  But afterwards, they are quite
different.  Since then, M2 has led the cycle weakly while MSIM2 has lagged by 2 to 5
quarters.
 The most important similarity among the monetary aggregates is that they all
appear to be unstable across the policy regime switch in 1979.
9  In Table 2 we see that 32
of the 44 cross-correlations are greater than the theoretical asymptotic critical value, 2.71.
Using this test, we can reject the hypothesis that the cyclical patterns were the same for
all four definitions of money that we considered.  When we compare the Wald statistics
calculated from the data with the more conservative critical values from our Monte Carlo
distribution (shown in parentheses in the bottom panel), we still find that 24 of the 44 are
larger than the 10 percent critical values.  Clearly, the cyclical properties are different in
the two periods.
                                                
9 Friedman and Kuttner (1992) also have documented the instability in the monetary aggregates across the
1979 policy regime switch.12
Prices and Inflation
Figure 4 shows the cyclical patterns for the price level measured by the consumer
price index (CPI) and the chain price indexes for personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
and GDP.  All display a similar pattern and a similar change after October 1979.  The
contemporaneous correlation in the earlier period was approximately –0.8 and rose by about
0.3 in the second period. The consumer price measures lead—with a negative sign—by two
quarters in the earlier period and by 4 quarters in the latter period. The GDP chain price
index appears to lead—again with a negative sign—by about one quarter in the earlier period
and three quarters in the second period.    Table 3 reports the tests for stability of the cross-
correlations.   We find that price and output correlations across the two periods are
significantly different if we use the asymptotic 10 percent critical value (2.71).  Using the
more conservative tests, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the price-output
correlations are the same across the policy regime switch.  Note that this result changed after
we added data for the four years, 1995 through 1998.  In Gavin and Kydland (1999), we
found that some of the cross-correlations were significantly different for both the CPI and the
GDP deflator even when we used the more conservative simulated critical values.
The standard deviations for the price level, shown in the bottom right-hand panel of
Figure 4, were slightly lower, on average, during the period following 1979 than they were in
the period from 1959:Q1 through 1979:Q3.  Note, as depicted in Figure 1, the second period
average masks a substantial dampening of the variability of inflation throughout the period.
There was a dampening of inflation volatility after 1982 and another, more obvious, decline
in the 1990s.13
Figure 5 shows the cyclical properties of the different inflation rates when measured
as deviations from the H-P trend.  King and Watson (1994) noted that there was strong
evidence of a Phillips curve relationship between the cyclical components of inflation and
unemployment.   Here we have used detrended output rather than the deviations of
unemployment from trend.   As suggested by the King and Watson paper, the
contemporaneous correlation between deviations of inflation from the H-P trend and business
sector output was positive in both periods for the consumer based measures.  The cross-
correlation with CPI inflation approximately doubled, rising from 0.22 in the pre-1979 period
to 0.49 in the latter period.  The correlation between inflation using the GDP chain price
index and output rose from –0.01 in the earlier period to 0.34 in the latter period.  Although
the contemporaneous correlations are larger in the second period, the correlations are smaller
at longer leads and lags.   The top panel of Table 4 shows the Wald statistics and the
simulated 10 percent critical values for testing the hypothesis that the correlations are equal
across periods.  Here, 25 of the 33 cross-correlations display a significant change when we
use the asymptotic critical value.  When we use the more conservative small sample critical
values, we still find that 22 of 33 are significant.
Figure 6 depicts the cross-correlations between detrended output and (unfiltered)
inflation.  This third method of comparing output and inflation corresponds to a common
specification of these variables, as they typically appear in the aggregate supply function of
macroeconomic models used by policymakers and their advisors.  Inflation is slightly more
variable if we do not remove the trend.  There is a decline in variability of all three measures
of inflation across the date of the policy regime switch.  Whether we use the H-P filter has a
large effect on the measure cyclical behavior.  In Figure 5, where inflation was filtered, we14
reported large negative leads in the early period that became smaller in absolute value in the
later period.  In Figure 6, where inflation was not filtered, the negative leads are smaller in
the first period, especially for the GDP chain-price index.  However, in the second period, the
negative leads are larger in absolute value if we do not filter the data.  The bottom panel of
Table 4 shows the results when the data are not filtered. The only lead that has a significant
change using the asymptotic critical value is for the GDP chain price index at a lead of five
quarters.  The lagged correlations are smaller in both periods if we do not filter the data, and
they change in approximately the same way as in the case of the filtered data.  There is a
significant decline in the positive correlations for CPI inflation at leads of 3, 4, and 5 quarters
that are significant even when we use the more conservative critical values computed in the
Monte Carlo simulations.
Interest Rates
We conclude our discussion of the cyclical behavior of nominal variables with three
market interest rates—the fed funds rate, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-year
Treasury bond rate.  As noted in the introduction, the method the Federal Reserve uses to
implement FOMC policy decisions has an important effect on the time series properties of
interest rates at high frequencies, days, weeks, months and, perhaps, quarters.  While we
investigated the effect of omitting the 1979:Q4 to 1982:Q3 data from all of our calculations,
it only mattered in the case of inflation and interest rates.  We will examine the post-1982:Q3
data for inflation in more detail in the next section.  Here, we report cross-correlations
between output and interest rates—both interest rates and output measured as deviations from
the H-P trend—for three alternative periods: 1959:Q1 to 1979:Q3, 1979:Q4 to 1998:Q4, and15
1982:Q4 to 1998:Q4.
10   Whether one should detrend interest rates or not depends on the
question being asked of the data.  Here, as was the case with inflation, we present the results
both with and without the H-P filtering.
We begin by examining interest rates after removing the trend with the H-P filter.
Figure 7 shows how the cyclical patterns changed after 1979.  Whether we omit the 3-year
period from 1979:Q4 to 1982:Q3 or not, there is a damping of the correlations after 1979.
The large negative correlation at leads of 4 and 5 quarters rise from about -0.7 in the period
before 1979 for all three interest rates to a range between -0.4 and -0.6 in the period after
1979.  The dampening also occurs at leads of 3 to 5 quarters.  The large positive correlations
at these leads falls from about 0.6 in the period before 1979 for all three interest rates to a
range between –0.07 and 0.34 in the period after 1979.
Tests for stability are shown in the top panel of Table 5 for the filtered interest rates.
The upper three rows report results when we break the sample in October 1979.  We can
reject the hypothesis that the correlations are stable across the October 1979 policy switch;
20 of 33 Wald statistics exceed the 10% critical value (2.71) implied by theory for large
samples.  When we compute the small sample distributions using Monte Carlo methods,
however, we find that only in the case of the contemporaneous correlation between the 10-
year rate and the business sector output can we reject the hypothesis that the correlations are
equal across the policy regimes.
The next three rows in the upper panel of Table 5 report the results when we delete
the three years, 1979:Q4 through 1982:Q3, from the second period.  There is a dramatic
increase in the correlations contemporaneously and at a one-quarter lead (shown in Figure 7).
                                                
10 Deleting the first three years has almost no effect on the measured cyclical pattern of the level variables
examined in this study, except interest rates.16
The important differences that result from omitting the 3-year interval can be seen in our
Wald statistics.  If we omit those three years and use the H-P filter on interest rates, then we
can easily reject the hypothesis that the cyclical patterns are the same before and after
October 1979.  If we use the filter, the strongest rejections are of the leading correlations.
Figure 8 shows that if we do not use the H-P filter, these interest rate correlations are
about 0.3 to 0.4 smaller in absolute value in the first period and only about 0.1 smaller in the
second period than observed in Figure 7.  Without the H-P filter, these correlations are about
same as with the filter in the earlier period and much lower in the latter period.
If we do not use the H-P filter, the leading correlations appear more similar, but the
lagging correlations are significantly different.  The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the tests
for stability in this case.  Using the asymptotic critical value of 2.71, we can reject stability
for the leading correlations only in the case of the 10-year bond rate.   On the other hand, we
can reject stability in the lagging correlations for all three interest rates even when using the
more conservative small-sample critical values.
The pattern for interest rates mimics closely the pattern for inflation.  In all periods
shown, interest rates have negative correlation with output at leads, then turn positive
contemporaneously and at lags.  The change in policy regime mainly raised the correlation at
leads and lowered the correlation at lags.  Although not shown here, the changes in the
patterns observed when we did not use the H-P filter on inflation are similar to the patterns
we see when we do not use the H-P filter on interest rates.17
Summary of Facts about the Cyclical Properties of Nominal Times Series
The adoption of a disinflation policy in October 1979 does not appear to have had a
measurable impact on the cyclical properties of real variables.  However, it made a dramatic
difference in the cyclical properties of nominal variables.  The cross-correlations between the
monetary base and business sector output switched signs after the policy regime changed.
Negative leads turned positive and positive lags became negative.  For the other monetary
aggregates, positive leads became smaller and usually insignificant.  Generally, the monetary
aggregates appear to be less cyclical after 1979.
Price indexes were generally countercyclical in both periods, but the cross-
correlations became smaller in absolute value after 1979 and the lead became longer.  The
absolute size of negative correlation was largest between the leads 2 to 0 before 1979 and
between leads 3 to 4 in the period afterwards.  We examined the cyclical properties of
inflation both with and without H-P filtering since both specifications are used in empirical
studies of the aggregate supply function.   Before 1979 there is a strong cyclical pattern, a
phase shift from the pattern observed for the price level.  There is a relatively large negative
correlation at leads and a large positive correlation at lags.  After 1979, the pattern flattened
for all the price indexes.  The changes were highly significant.  Without the HP filtering in
the earlier period, the negative values at leads were close to zero and positive values at lags
became as large as 0.4.  After October 1979, the negative leads became somewhat larger, but
contemporaneous and lagging correlations were close to zero.  The cyclical patterns for
market interest rates mirrored the patterns observed in the inflation rates.18
NOMINAL GROWTH RATES
In the previous section we examined the business cycle properties of nominal
variables, using the H-P filter to define the cyclical component.  In this section, we examine
the relationship among nominal growth rates where the trends are determined by monetary
policy.  As we saw in Figure 1 and discussed in the introduction, policymakers allowed the
inflation rate to drift upward over the period between 1959 and 1980.  They appeared to be
focussed more sharply on the real variables rather than on controlling inflation.  After 1980,
The Federal Reserve appeared to be putting relatively more weight on controlling inflation.
We examine the covariance structure of data sets that contain growth rates of eight nominal
variables: four measures of the money stock (SL Base, MZM, M2, and MSIM2), three price
indexes (CPI, PCE chain price index, and the GDP chain price index), and nominal GDP.
We begin by comparing simple descriptive statistics—means, standard deviations and the
autocorrelation functions—before and after the October 1979 policy switch.  Next, we
examine the cross-correlation functions between inflation and different measures of monetary
growth.  Before concluding, we also report the cross-correlations between nominal GDP and
monetary growth.
For almost all our results, it doesn’t matter much whether or not we omit the period
from October 1979 to October 1982.  We add footnotes when there were important
differences.  We decided to omit those three years in this section because
•   they were a time of transition when people were learning about the new policy
regime,
•   there were many regulatory changes during this period which caused abrupt shifts in
the time series for measures of the money stock, and19
•   the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure affected the data at high frequencies
and using a first difference filter emphasizes the time series properties at high
frequencies.
In all of the results reported for nominal growth rates we are comparing statistics comparing
results from the period 1959:1 to 1979:3 with the period from 1982:4 to 1998:4.
The Time-Series Properties of Money Growth, Inflation, and Nominal GDP Growth
As we saw in Figure 1, the important aspect of the policy regime switch was the
successful stabilization of inflation at a moderate rate.   The average inflation rates were not
that much different—the largest difference was in CPI inflation that averaged 4.2 percent in
the first period and 3.2 percent in the second.  However, there was a large increase in
inflation from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, while the inflation rate was much more
stable after 1982.  There was slight upward trend in the 1980s that reversed in the 1990s.
Somewhat surprisingly, average growth rates of the narrow measures of money, SL
Base and MZM, are actually larger following the successful disinflation policy (See the top
panel of Figure 9).  For the non-interest bearing components of these narrow aggregates, this
surprising result can be attributed partly to the one-time shift in the level demand for money
that comes from a lower nominal interest rate.  Nominal interest rates generally declined
throughout the period from 1982 until 1993.  For example, the 3-month Treasury bill rate
declined from almost 13 percent in the first half of 1983 to average about 3 percent in 1993.
There was also a large demand for currency from abroad in the 1980s as the Soviet Union
broke up and some high inflation countries in Latin America began to use more U.S.
currency.  For the interest-bearing components, the more rapid growth can be attributed to20
changes in regulations that allowed banks to pay interest on checkable deposits and to offer
easy access on demand for some savings-type deposits.  These zero maturity deposits are
included in MZM and grew rapidly after 1982. The two broad measures of money, M2 and
the MSIM2 were lower in the second period.
The variability of the monetary growth rates is about the same or greater after 1982
than it was before 1979—much greater for MZM and slightly less for MSIM2 (See the
bottom panel of figure 9).  The variability of inflation and nominal GDP growth was
substantially lower in the second period than it was in the first.
As shown in Figure 10, the autocorrelation coefficients for the growth rates of the
narrow monetary aggregates and all three measures of inflation decay faster after 1982 than
they did before October 1979.  The autocorrelation functions for M2 and MSIM2 actually
rose in the second period for lags 3 and higher.  The largest shifts in autocorrelation functions
for measures of the money stock occurred in the cases of SL Base and M2 (see Table 6).
Table 6 shows that the shifts in the cases of the chain-price indexes are generally not
statistically significant if we use the Monte Carlo critical values.  The most significant
declines were in the autocorrelations of CPI inflation.  This is the one case where excluding
the three interim years—1979:4 to 1982:3—was important.  If we include these years, we
find a more modest decline in the autocorrelation function except at the longest lags.
The Lag from Money to Prices
It is conventional wisdom among macroeconomists and policymakers that there is a
long and variable lag between money and the prices.
11  Work by Irving Fisher during the
                                                
11 See Friedman (1961) for an influential discussion of this issue.  Bryan and Gavin (1994) and Gavin and
Kydland (1999) explore possibility that the variable lag may be due to instability in the policy function.21
early part of this century indicated a much shorter lag than is typically found in more recent
studies. He thought the lag would be no longer than three months:
“It was in August, 1915, that the quantity of money in the United States began its
rapid increase.  One month later prices began to shoot upward, keeping almost exact
pace with the quantity of money.  In February, 1916, money suddenly stopped
increasing, and two-and-a-half months later prices stopped likewise.  Similar striking
correspondences have continued to occur with an average lag between the money
cause and the price effect of about one-and-three quarters months.” Fisher (1918,
Page 5)
In a recent study using U.S. data from the period from 1965:Q3 to 1995:Q2, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) report that, following a contractionary monetary policy
shock, “The GDP deflator is flat for roughly a year and a half after which it declines.” Page
23.  One explanation for the difference in perceptions of the lag is the difference the
monetary policy regime.  Our premise is that the variable lags reflect variation in policy
regimes and inflation expectations.
That there will be differences in measures of the lag before and after 1980 is apparent
in the data.  The cross-correlations between CPI inflation and monetary growth are shown in
Figure 11.  As the upper left hand panel shows, quarterly series of monetary base growth and
inflation were highly correlated in the period before October 1979.  Afterwards, the
correlation between the two series is approximately zero for all lags back to 12 quarters.  As
Table 7 shows, the change in the cross-correlations between the monetary base and inflation
are larger and more significant than the changes for any of the other aggregates.  The Wald
test for equality of the correlation coefficient are larger than the Monte Carlo 10 percent
critical values for the contemporaneous and 12 lags of monetary growth.  The result is not as
strong for the other aggregates, mainly because there was not much correlation between
money and prices at short lags for MZM and the M2 measures.  At lags of 6 quarters or22
more, the early period cross-correlations were relatively large and, using the theoretical
asymptotic critical value, the correlations were all significantly smaller after 1982.  However,
only in the case of M2, can we consistently reject equality across the two periods using the
more conservative Monte Carlo critical values.
In the early period, the monetary policy allowed the average inflation rate to ratchet
upward with each business cycle.  This policy was associated with high variances in nominal
growth rates and high cross-correlations between monetary base growth and inflation.  When
the Federal Reserve adopted a successful policy to stabilize inflation at a moderate rate, the
cross-correlations with the monetary base went to zero and the autocorrelations of inflation
measures decayed more quickly.
The Lag from Money to Nominal GDP
Many economists supported monetary targeting in the 1970s because of the close
relationship between growth rates of the money stock and nominal GDP.  The St. Louis
Equation developed by Andersen and Jordan (1968) was based on this relationship and was
the foundation for many small forecasting models until the early 1980s.  The breakdown in
the relationship between money and nominal output then led many economists to lose
confidence in the reliability of monetary targeting as a strategy for running policy.
In earlier sections, we documented a dramatic shift in the cyclical behavior of the
monetary aggregates, and a significant shift in the relationship between money growth and
inflation.  Therefore, we also expected to see a change in the cross-correlations between
nominal GDP growth and monetary growth.  As Figure 12 shows, this was the case with the
SL Base and MSIM2, but not for MZM or M2.  In the earlier period, growth in nominal GDP23
was correlated with contemporaneous and lagged SL Base growth back to about 6 quarters.
The correlation was highest—nearly 0.5—at the first lag and tapered off to values of 0.2 or
lower at longer lags.  In the second period, the contemporaneous correlation was 0.1 and rose
gradually to peak around 0.3 at lag 7 and then fell to zero at the 10-quarter lag.  In the case of
MSIM2, the cross-correlations at short lags were lower in the second period.  As shown in
Table 8, the Wald test rejects equality at the second and third lags.
Summary of Fact about Nominal Growth Rates
Generally, the monetary policy in the early period allowed the average inflation rate
to ratchet upward with each business cycle.  This policy was associated with high variances,
high autocorrelations, and high cross-correlations among nominal variables.  The moderate
inflation policy followed in the second period was associated with lower mean growth rates,
less volatility, and lower cross-correlations.
The cross-correlations between nominal GDP growth and growth in MZM and M2
seem to be approximately the same across the October 1979 regime switch.  The biggest
differences were in the cross-correlations with the monetary base.
CONCLUSION
There are important implications of this paper for building monetary models.  Our
results show that researchers should take care when they assume that the covariance
structure of data sets is stationary.   Our results suggest that is generally not the case for
nominal time series spanning October 1979.   The strategy of modern macroeconomics is
to build general equilibrium models and compare the covariance structure of data implied24
by the model to the covariance structure observed in the data.  Large deviations signal
areas for further research.  This research strategy has worked better in real business cycle
studies because the covariance structure of real variables seem to be relatively stable
across countries and policy regimes.  It has not worked so well in monetary business
cycles because there is no general agreement about the facts.  Our results suggest that one
way to find regularities in the data may be to examine and compare episodes with similar
monetary policy regimes.25
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Stability Tests -- Cyclical Properties of Real Variables
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
2.22 0.82 0.07 0.22 0.74 2.76 1.49 0.34 0.09 1.15 2.41
(5.1) (5.09) (5.51) (6.85) (8.92) (9.07) (5.5) (5.06) (5.27) (6.17) (6.81)
1.72 0.51 0.12 0.00 0.16 4.08 3.07 0.97 0.00 0.63 1.73
(5.69) (5.01) (5.02) (6.08) (7.55) (7.63) (5.33) (5.2) (5.53) (6.19) (6.93)
2.31 1.12 0.10 0.33 0.59 0.34 0.25 0.05 0.25 1.17 2.13
(4.82) (4.31) (4.31) (5.38) (7.94) (9.86) (8.04) (7.63) (7.47) (7.79) (8.22)
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.64 0.00 1.04 0.45 0.10 0.06
(5.97) (5.65) (5.71) (6.07) (6.48) (7.35) (4.83) (3) (2.9) (2.99) (3.8)
0.32 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 2.95 0.27 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01
(6.66) (6.11) (6.47) (7.1) (8.51) (11) (7.76) (5.7) (4.7) (4.81) (5.22)
3.13 2.15 1.62 1.52 1.44 0.59 0.97 3.73 2.13 1.01 0.76
(4.27) (4.15) (3.91) (3.84) (3.66) (4.36) (10.1) (10.53) (8.97) (8.3) (7.61)
0.19 1.80 3.88 6.59 4.11 1.71 0.07 0.00 0.44 1.35 4.03
(10.2) (6   10.77) (10.73) (8.21) (5.12) (3.25) (3.12) (3.57) (4.28) (4.4) (4.67)
1959:Q1 to 1998:Q4
Note: Simulated 10% critical values are shown in parenthesis. The light shading indicates that the 
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Table 2
Stability Tests -- Cyclical Properties of Monetary Aggregates
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
11.27 7.21 2.02 0.00 1.72 6.05 13.72 20.84 18.10 18.92 19.22
(8.31) (8.36) (8.47) (9.13) (9.32) (9.4) (9.43) (9.71) (10.09) (11.29) (11.65)
0.03 1.29 8.28 14.90 15.35 15.22 12.71 7.81 2.75 0.82 0.30
(12.68) (11.66) (11.68) (13.43) (12.84) (10.33) (8.4) (8.18) (8.66) (10.01) (10.52)
2.31 9.87 24.29 34.62 31.14 20.57 10.82 2.54 0.07 2.46 9.82
(8.41) (9.18) (10.01) (10.8) (9.85) (8) (7.32) (7.27) (8.62) (9.53) (10.31)
8.54 20.71 40.72 54.09 40.89 19.80 5.44 0.01 6.84 19.44 32.99
(9.63) (9.23) (10.05) (11.56) (10.09) (8.05) (7.06) (7.33) (8.07) (9.7) (10.94)
1959:Q1 to 1998:Q4
Note: The light shading indicates that the Chi-square test statistic is larger than the asymptotic 10% critical value 
(2.71).  The dark shading indicates that the Chi-square test statistic is larger than the simulated 10% critical value 
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Table 3
Stability Tests -- Cyclical Properties of the Price Level
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
Variable X
CPI 3.27 0.27 1.87 6.96 9.84 10.74 6.94 2.78 0.29 0.3 3.11
(8.03) (10.07) (13.63) (16.29) (15.51) (12.35) (7.41) (6.13) (5.71) (6.29) (7.34)
PCE Chain Price Index  5.11 0.63 1.39 8.45 11.81 10.31 5.09 1.04 0.05 1.75 5.98
(7.43) (8.61) (11.44) (19.19) (24.06) (22.47) (12.64) (8.76) (6.53) (6.47) (7.5)
GDP Chain Price Index  8.88 5.53 0.75 0.96 4.62 8.65 6.07 1.91 0.31 0.02 1.45
(9.28) (9.25) (10.33) (12.36) (15.82) (19.78) (14.09) (9.94) (7.82) (7.27) (6.91)
1959:Q1 to 1998:Q4
Note: Simulated 10% critical values are shown in parenthesis. The light shading indicates that the Chi-square test 
statistic is larger than the asymptotic 10% critical value (2.71).
5 − t X
4 − t X 3 − t X
2 − t X 1 − t X t X 1 + t X 2 + t X 3 + t X 4 + t X 5 + t X
d:\gavin2\price\pricesim.prg
d:\gavin2\price\output\pricesimout.xlsTable 4
Stability Tests -- Cyclical Properties of Inflation 
(with H-P filtered inflation)
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
16.86 17.98 15.4 6.44 3.71 3.54 0.03 3.21 10.38 14.71 15.21
(6.69) (5.07) (4.29) (3.16) (2.62) (2.83) (3.73) (5.83) (6.95) (7.51) (7.19)
12.04 17.50 16.43 8.60 2.81 1.58 0.18 3.93 9.64 13.20 10.46
(6.33) (5.63) (4.71) (3.58) (2.91) (2.85) (3.48) (4.72) (6) (5.63) (5.59)
0.32 6.14 13.19 11.21 5.08 4.93 0.70 0.63 0.88 1.86 6.46
(5.53) (4.82) (4.14) (3.64) (3.28) (2.52) (2.53) (2.72) (3.54) (5.13) (5.75)
(Infation not H-P filtered)
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
0 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.04 1.1 2.89 4.64 5.28 5.19
(5.98) (7.33) (6.34) (6.40) (5.17) (4.24) (4.68) (4.73) (4.57) (4.41) (4.19)
0.19 0 0.04 0.03 0.41 0.48 1.66 3.39 4.25 3.56 2.66
(6.17) (9.30) (11.06) (12.31) (11.82) (6.76) (6.22) (5.14) (4.36) (4.37) (4.17)
3.03 0.77 0.05 0.05 0.34 0.21 0.88 2.32 2.01 1.8 2.76
(5.25) (8.78) (10.86) (12.69) (12.32) (8.52) (7.53) (6.62) (4.59) (4.31) (4.49)
1959:Q1 to 1998:Q4
Note: The light shading indicates that the Chi-square test statistic is larger than the asymptotic 10% critical value (2.71).  The dark shading 
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StabilityTests -- Cyclical Properties of Nominal Interest Rates.
Interest Rates H-P Filtered
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
3.63 4.44 2.69 1.26 1.69 1.32 0.10 3.72 6.53 4.36 4.18
(10.08) (6.65) (3.97) (2.5) (2.18) (2.61) (3.8) (6.96) (12) (11.29) (9.73)
7.14 7.31 3.15 1.21 2.07 2.39 0.00 2.71 4.15 3.97 5.89
(8.11) (5.37) (3.54) (2.66) (2.67) (3.14) (4.47) (7.75) (9.84) (9.48) (7.74)
5.01 7.00 4.91 4.70 6.51 10.47 6.98 1.91 0.26 0.74 6.32
(10.61) (10.1) (9.94) (8.84) (8.34) (7.79) (7.41) (7.1) (7.77) (8.35) (8.99)
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Omitting 79:Q4 to 82:Q3)
2.05 4.70 5.50 4.37 3.81 5.00 1.94 0.05 2.40 5.27 5.35
(10.08) (6.65) (3.97) (2.5) (2.18) (2.61) (3.8) (6.96) (12) (11.29) (9.73)
5.33 7.11 6.11 4.41 4.78 5.74 1.89 0.18 2.74 5.88 7.05
(8.11) (5.37) (3.54) (2.66) (2.67) (3.14) (4.47) (7.75) (9.84) (9.48) (7.74)
3.94 6.08 6.90 8.96 10.45 13.82 11.46 3.15 0.04 3.81 10.80
(10.61) (10.1) (9.94) (8.84) (8.34) (7.79) (7.41) (7.1) (7.77) (8.35) (8.99)
Interest Rates not H-P Filtered
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Break in 1979 Q3)
0.18 0.12 0.49 1.31 1.72 3.37 7.76 12.10 13.04 11.07 9.20
(9.22) (9.45) (8.74) (7.16) (5.46) (6.42) (7.70) (7.92) (6.85) (6.74) (7.24)
0.61 0.47 1.35 2.60 2.48 3.29 6.86 10.33 10.72 9.86 9.47
(5.86) (4.84) (5.36) (5.59) (5.01) (5.66) (6.25) (6.08) (5.40) (5.17) (5.16)
4.27 3.84 4.12 3.77 2.45 1.52 1.91 3.14 4.23 6.00 8.45
(47.25) (28.81) (12.32) (3.95) (2.70) (8.91) (16.70) (22.95) (23.45) (19.01) (11.09)
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods (Omitting 79:Q4 to 82:Q3)
0.20 0.04 0.11 0.48 1.08 1.91 4.44 8.06 10.59 11.76 11.38
(9.22) (9.45) (8.74) (7.16) (5.46) (6.42) (7.70) (7.92) (6.85) (6.74) (7.24)
0.50 0.29 0.54 1.15 1.43 1.92 4.08 7.73 9.83 11.30 11.80
(5.86) (4.84) (5.36) (5.59) (5.01) (5.66) (6.25) (6.08) (5.40) (5.17) (5.16)
2.61 2.37 2.07 1.56 1.05 0.73 0.93 2.59 5.49 8.87 12.00
















Note: The light shading indicates that the Chi-square test statistic is larger than the asymptotic 10% critical value (2.71).  
The dark shading indicates that the Chi-square test statistic is larger than the simulated 10% critical value shown in 
parentheses. 
5 − t X 4 − t X 3 − t X 2 − t X 1 − t X t X 1 + t X 2 + t X 3 + t X 4 + t X 5 + t X
5 − t X 4 − t X 3 − t X 2 − t X 1 − t X t X 1 + t X 2 + t X 3 + t X 4 + t X 5 + t X
5 − t X 4 − t X 3 − t X 2 − t X 1 − t X t X 1 + t X 2 + t X 3 + t X 4 + t X 5 + t X
5 − t X 4 − t X 3 − t X 2 − t X 1 − t X t X 1 + t X 2 + t X 3 + t X 4 + t X 5 + t XTable 6
Stability Tests -- Autocorrelation Function of Nominal Growth Rates
Wald test for equality of auto-correlations across sample periods (1959 Q1- 1979 Q3, 1982 Q4-1998 Q4)
Variable X X -1 X -2 X -3 X -4 X -5 X -6 X -7 X -8 X -9 X -10 X -11 X -12
0.02 0.79 2.13 3.19 6.08 7.08 13.98 10.35 7.57 9.47 12.46 9.52
(7.65) (7.16) (6.45) (5.17) (5.37) (5.68) (5.74) (6.19) (6.18) (5.60) (6.14) (6.21)
4.31 4.83 2.95 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.96 0.88 1.74 3.39 0.01 0.19
(4.12) (4.73) (5.59) (6.25) (5.89) (6.24) (5.67) (5.94) (5.86) (6.15) (5.98) (5.94)
1.66 0.05 1.12 4.91 9.68 9.86 19.98 19.8 15.24 14.77 6.31 4.52
(6.46) (8.55) (9.48) (9.75) (7.52) (7.09) (6.79) (6.82) (6.33) (6.23) (5.85) (6.07)
0.34 1.52 2.18 2.7 4.39 8.33 10.58 11.09 8.58 3.9 1.86 0.73
(9.99) (11.42) (13.00) (14.39) (13.05) (11.42) (11.52) (10.52) (10.24) (11.35) (10.33) (10.10)
13.45 10.28 5.03 5.69 3.74 0.05 0.05 0.75 0.71 2.03 4.03 3.29
(11.22) (11.43) (9.98) (12.86) (10.39) (9.88) (11.12) (10.18) (9.95) (9.84) (9.05) (8.44)
6.29 4.45 0.82 1.51 2.48 1.36 0.44 0.83 1.62 1.44 1.44 1.78
(13.51) (16.63) (12.24) (11.34) (15.14) (13.29) (12.28) (12.62) (12.22) (11.95) (11.49) (11.45)
2.49 0.43 0.26 0.18 1.02 2.44 0.81 3.57 0 0.2 0.19 0.14
(6.67) (3.69) (4.57) (2.84) (2.80) (2.69) (2.63) (2.61) (3.07) (2.80) (2.69) (2.99)
27.01 32.59 20.51 21.94 17.49 8.81 6.22 8.37 6.88 4.38 8.83 6.9
(4.73) (5.14) (4.90) (5.45) (4.40) (4.52) (4.95) (4.31) (4.29) (4.32) (4.10) (4.04)
GDP
CPI
Note:  The two periods compared are 1959:2 to 1979:3 and 1982:4 to 1998:4.  The dark shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the small 
sample 10 percent critical levels that are shown in parantheses.  The light shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the asymptotic 10 percent 









Stability Tests -- Inflation and Monetary Growth
Chi-square test for equality of correlations across sample periods 
Variable X 0 X -1 X -2 X -3 X -4 X -5 X -6 X -7 X -8 X -9 X -10 X -11 X -12
SL Base 12.63 10.25 12.60 16.97 19.37 18.01 14.19 8.72 8.49 11.57 12.20 8.48 16.26
(7.11) (6.36) (6.74) (6.47) (6.74) (6.46) (6.33) (6.22) (6.40) (6.19) (6.37) (5.95) (6.58)
MZM 1.36 0.81 1.82 0.62 0.23 1.37 3.13 2.30 1.48 3.92 4.10 1.03 4.43
(4.04) (4.69) (4.51) (4.47) (5.19) (4.84) (4.33) (4.40) (4.07) (4.20) (4.79) (4.29) (4.36)
M2 2.64 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 2.78 6.75 6.87 6.84 8.78 8.45 5.32 8.70
(7.16) (6.71) (6.96) (7.06) (7.32) (6.45) (5.77) (6.27) (6.44) (6.13) (6.09) (6.34) (6.69)
M2MSI 1.35 0.38 0.07 0.99 1.04 3.13 6.35 7.24 8.00 10.79 8.34 4.94 5.29
(9.56) (9.76) (8.87) (8.97) (10.15) (9.83) (9.47) (10.30) (9.97) (9.35) (9.59) (9.48) (9.72)
Note:  The two periods compared are 1959:2 to 1979:3 and 1982:4 to 1998:4.  The dark shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the small 
sample 10 percent critical levels that are shown in parantheses.  The light shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the asymptotic 10 percen
critical value (2.71), but not the small sample value.Table 8
Stability Tests -- Nominal GDP growth and Monetary Growth
Wald test for equality of correlations across sample periods (1959 Q1- 1979 Q3, 1982 Q4-1998 Q4)
Variable X X 0 X -1 X -2 X -3 X -4 X -5 X -6 X -7 X -8 X -9 X -10 X -11 X -12
SL Base 4.62 6.15 4.32 2.27 0.38 2.27 0.84 0.07 0.69 2.79 4.41 1.69 6.81
(2.77) (3.11) (3.89) (3.66) (3.78) (3.53) (3.75) (4.02) (4.09) (3.67) (3.89) (3.70) (3.68)
MZM 0.72 0.02 0.50 0.22 1.11 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.33 0.03 1.31 0.52 0.67
(2.63) (2.63) (2.83) (3.28) (2.96) (3.16) (3.54) (3.25) (3.43) (3.29) (3.44) (3.26) (3.30)
M2 0.11 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.04 0.52 1.22 0.83 2.43 1.81 0.03
(2.17) (2.13) (2.36) (2.22) (2.11) (2.17) (2.33) (2.19) (2.22) (2.34) (2.44) (2.27) (2.23)
M2MSI 0.48 1.86 4.57 2.68 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.32
(2.08) (2.41) (2.51) (2.30) (2.14) (2.36) (2.51) (2.67) (2.46) (2.47) (2.47) (2.29) (2.88)
Note:  The two periods compared are 1959:2 to 1979:3 and 1982:4 to 1998:4.  The dark shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the small 
sample 10 percent critical levels that are shown in parantheses.  The light shading indicates that the wald statistic exceeds the asymptotic 10 percent 
critical value (2.71), but not the small sample value.Figure 1
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n 59:1 to 79:3
79:4 to 98:405/23/2000
Figure 3























































































































SL Base MZM M2 MSIM2
Before 1979
After 1979Figure 4
Cyclical Properties of the Price Level




























































































CPI PCE Chain Price  GDP Chain Price 
59:1 to 79:3
79:4 to 98:4     Figure 5:  Cyclical Properties of Inflation (H-P Filter)






























































































CPI PCE Chain Price GDP Chain Price
59:2 to 79:3
79:4 to 98:4     Figure 6:  Cyclical Properties of Inflation (no H-P Filter)





























































































CPI PCE Chain Price GDP Chain Price
59:2 to 79:3
































































































Fed Funds 3-month 10-year
59:1 to 79:3
79:4 to 98:4



















































































Fed Funds 3-month FCM10
59:1 to 79:3
79:4 to 98:4
82:4 to 98:4Figure 9
















































































Autocovariance Functions for Nominal Variables
Quarterly Lags Quarterly Lags




































































































123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
82:4-98:4
59:1-79:3











































123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
82:4-98:4
59:1-79:3












123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
82:4-98:4
59:1-79:3Figure 11

























































0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Quarterly Lags
59:1 to 79:3
82:4 to 98:4Figure 12










































0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Quarter Lags 
59:1 to 79:3
82:4 to 98:4